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On the ontology of the computing process and the epistemology of the computed.
Abstract:  Software  Intensive  Science  (SIS)  challenges  in  many  ways  our  current  scientific
methods. This affects significantly our notion of science and scientific interpretation of the world,
driving at the same time the philosophical debate. We consider some issues prompted by SIS in the
light of the philosophical categories of ontology and epistemology.
Keywords: complexity, computational errors, software design, epistemic trust.
Introduction
The introduction of software in scientific research has fundamentally changed our way of
understanding and categorizing the world.  The distinction between software-intensive (SIS) and
non-software-intensive  science  (NSIS)  considered  in  (Symons,  Horner  2014)  suggests  two
considerations:  firstly, software  has  become an  essential  part  of  our  scientific  world-view and
science done with little or no help of computational techniques is becoming obsolete, at the risk of
offering limited or partial results; secondly, scientific knowledge that is produced or aided by an
intensive use of software is generated in ways that make it impossible for its content and its results
to  be  articulated  otherwise.  For  these  reasons,  computational  methods  of  producing  scientific
knowledge are non-neutral, both with respect to the description of the world and to our knowledge
thereof. (Symons, Horner 2014) propose an important quantitative assessment of SIS in terms of the
path complexity of software code.  This highly stimulating debate can be further approached by
considering some open problems for the Philosophy of Computing directly deriving from the SIS
vs. NSIS distinction on the basis of the traditional categories of ontology and epistemology.
Complex ontologies threatened by errors.
The ontology of software intensive science can be analysed in terms of highly complex programs
and of the complexity of the systems generated or simulated by such programs. These two aspects
are  clearly  intertwined,  but  distinct.  Let  us  refer  to  the  former  simply  as  the  'ontology  of  the
computing process' and to the latter as the 'ontology of the computed'.
Conditionality  statements  and  branching  paths  represent  a  crucial  way  of  measuring
uncertainty in the ontology of the computing process. By this, we mean the number of possible
outcomes of program execution,  as analysed in  (Symons,  Horner 2014):  the more complex the
program, the more  uncertain1 its  outcome.  This property of the underlying algorithm maps the
complexity of what is computed in the exploring possibilities of the program. It  is tempting to
compare it to the complexity of the brain and the logical processes involved in NSIS research, but
this  would  easily  lead  to  arguing  that  neural/cognitive  complexity  in  the  latter  context  is  still
unmatched  by  any  program  and  possibly  will  remain  so  on  the  long  run.  It  is  instead  more
interesting to focus on the high variability of methods and problem definitions offered by algorithm
design  and  the  specific  language  chosen:  the  same  scientific  problem  can  be  modelled  (and
eventually solved) by differently designed algorithms and the complexity of such designs can be
affected  inherently  by  the  choice  of  language.  To offer  an  example  limited  to  programming
languages, if-else statements are more or less crucial to the structure of the program, depending on
the language used: in the case of a functional language like Haskell, where inductive constructions
are more common, conditional statements are sensibly less relevant compared to other languages,
1   Notoriously,  the  level  of  complexity  of  algorithmic  systems  of  rules  can  be  systematized  in  terms  of  their
organizational  behaviour  with  respect  to  output:  fixed-point  stabilizing,  oscillating,  random/chaotic,  universally
computing. See e.g. the explication in terms of cellular automata offered in (Wolfram 2002).
such as Java or C and derivatives. This is certainly to be taken into account in view of the Turing-
completeness of all these languages, as duly mentioned in (Symons, Horner 2014). But the question
of  principle  remains:  how  much  freedom  is  allowed  by  the  computational  construction  of  a
scientific result? This question reflects the well-known problem of characterizing programs in terms
of their specification.2 A program specification should establish what the program is supposed to do.
On the one hand, such description will necessarily be incomplete, as the designer will never be able
to take into account all the contextual elements valid or even admissible to the correct execution of
the program. On the other-hand, avoiding over-specification of the program seems to offer more
space for the  de facto standards of good programming, i.e. the “natural” way the programming
practice  manages  to  create  well-behaving  programs.3 This  latter  approach  means  allowing  less
structured design methods, favouring a more direct problem-fixing attitude, which clearly induces a
different sort of complexity. Such change of perspective is becoming even more pressing in view of
disciplines  such  as  machine  learning,  where  deductive  methods  are  replaced  by  statistical
correlations  to  extract  significant  patterns.  It  is  therefore  becoming  essential  to understand the
difference – and account for a good balance – between structured complexity of algorithm design
and the unstructured complexity of code-writing practices and data mining procedures. This crucial
issue is still largely ignored: the way programs and computational practices are designed affects
directly the result of scientific inquiry in SIS and in particular what is accounted as scientifically
valid. 
This leads us directly to the second aspect relevant to the ontology of the program:  complex
programs  which  often  make  use  of  non  well-specified  design  methodologies  or  not  always
deductive  procedures,  are  inevitably  threatened  by  computational  errors,4 whose  detection  and
resolution  represents  a  necessary  methodological  step  in  establishing  syntactic  and  semantic
correctness of scientific results. There exists an extensive branch of current research in software
engineering  and formal  methods dedicated  to  testing  and proving software  correct.  Most  well-
known examples are model-checking, verification,  certified programming. Each of these has its
own foundational approach: to make only some examples, model checking can be seen as an  a
posteriori method of testing programs by looking for output instances that are no models of the
specification; certification, instead, is an a priori method of asserting the principled correctness of
any future program execution.  Both are  crucially  affected  by the above mentioned problem of
balancing between under- and over-specification. The ability of detecting failure at either compile
or  runtime  (and  subsequently  solving  it,  or  at  least  handling  it  in  the  sense  of  preserving
functionality) in highly articulated algorithmic patterns reflects their complex structure, in terms of
semantic specification satisfaction, syntactical data structure definition and accessibility.5 The more
complex the program, the more essential is to assess correctness and prevent failure. This bears
great effects for the 'ontology of the computed'. 
It seems, by the above considerations, that a (complex) program proven correct in terms of
(complex, sophisticated) techniques could deliver a more in-depth representation of the object of
computation; accordingly, our relying on computational methods to know and to prove that we
know highlights the complexity of the scientific method underlying SIS. This offers a bridge to
consider the epistemology of the computed.
A trust-based, procedural epistemology.
The complex ontology of the computing process leads to an analysis of the epistemology underlying
its design: how does scientific knowledge change in view of software development and use? How
does its complexity affect scientific comprehension and certainty in the results? 
2 See e.g. (Turner 2014), especially sec.2.
3 For a practical view on the problem of program design and standards, see for example the interview to Douglas 
Crockford in (Seibel 2009), pp.125-127.
4 See (Symons, Horner 2014), especially section 4.
5 For an overview of errors in the design and production cycle of computational systems, see (Fresco, Primiero 
2013).
Symons and  Horner (2014, section 3) consider the relation between epistemic confidence
and software reliability. This is a new way of approaching well-known problems of expertise from
social  epistemology.6  Software reliability, which is  substituting expert  credibility, is arguably a
matter of both software design and practice, considered during the whole production and life-cycle
of the software. To make an easy example, consider the IBM AI  Watson, winner of the TV-show
Jeopardy  against two human champions and now programmed to help medical doctors diagnose
and treat patients in real life:7 the standard relation between patient and doctor is bound to change in
a crucial way, and security and trust are the relevant areas of software engineering in this context.
The reliability of the machine is at stake, but the epistemic attitude of the user is involved as well.
The important question for the Philosophy of Computing is not just how we design trustworthy and
secure systems, but also what it means for a user that a system and its output are trustworthy and
secure. Practices such as debugging, failure detection, static analysis, among others, increase system
reliability in objective ways, and the problem of fixing standards for computational experiments and
their  reproducibility is still  open. But this only identifies reliability with the practical nature of
systems' performance and consistency. From the user's point of view, system's reliability is also an
issue of expectations. These considerations lead to the analysis of reliability as trustworthiness: trust
in  software  offers  an  effective,  although  partial,  measure  of  program  usability  and  epistemic
certainty it generates, but it also represents a risk. The more trusted a computational process is, the
less transparent its use becomes. One way to avoid this risk is reducing trust as delegation and
maximising  trust  as  accounting  of  resources  use  and origin.  This  area  presents  plenty  of  little
explored topics, for example the problem of defining malfunctioning programs and certifying them
untrustworthy.8 The  design  of  computational  processes,  especially  when  involved  in  scientific
research, strongly relies on the interpretation of validity as reliability and on the fact that the latter
is, at  least  in some measure,  a function of the designer's  and user's  trust  in the system.  In this
analysis, there is a clear shift towards the practical nature of SIS and an underlying engineering
understanding of  validity, where the latter  has  been redesigned in  terms of  weak and eventual
consistency for distributed systems.9 This means, in other words, that validity and availability of
computational processes have become locally constrained, agent-based notions. 
This appears to be in seemingly strong contrast with the nature of processes in non-software
based science: on the one hand, scientific laws are compared to conditional statements in branching
paths of software code; on the other hand, the former seem to have a normative value in describing
reality independently of our experience, while the latter seem to be accountable for a procedural,
user-dependent characterization. Laws of nature tell us what can be known of the world, given some
general conditions; code instead seems to tell us what the user, in her local conditions,  can do with
the world. Moreover, the scientific description of nature is not affected by performance criteria,10
while  algorithms are by definition  evaluated just  in  terms  of  those criteria:  speed,  consistency,
scalability, availability, to name a few, and their results are evaluated in view of the user's trust on
the  non-transparent  parts  of  algorithm  execution.  This  is  another  reason  why  experiments  by
computational means seem to offer an entirely different set of epistemological conditions than those
in the natural sciences.11 This has suggested that computation, in terms of programmability, offers
its  own  model  of  nature,  and  that  natural  systems  (as  known  from  standard  sciences)  are
comparable, distinguishable,  or  even conform to such a model.12 
This intense debate, which can be summarized as the quest to discern algorithmic structures
6    See e.g (Thagard, 2001).
7 http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/ibmwatson/work.html
8 The focus is currently on trustworthiness certification. For an analysis of software malfunctioning, see (Floridi, 
Fresco, Primiero, 201x). For a first definition of the semantics of untrustworthiness, see e.g. (Primiero, Kosolosky 
2013)
9 See e.g. (Lynch, Gilbert 2002).
10 We strictly consider the description of nature by laws, while certainly performance criteria affect the way those 
laws work.
11 See (Angius 2014) and (Schiaffonati, Verdicchio 2013) for recent debates on experiments and hypothesis testing in 
computational settings. 
12 For such an approach, see e.g. (Zenil 2013).
from rules to create a model of nature, is crucial for SIS in order to understand how the algorithmic
representation of law-like phenomena affect our interpretation of the world.
Concluding remarks
The notion of software intensive science starts with determining the complexity of computational
processes, but it offers much more in terms of conceptual and technical problems for both scientists
and philosophers. The kind and number of questions arising in this context are large and diverse.
We have listed some of these problems, reflected in epistemological and ontological terms: from the
methods underlying algorithm design and data mining to their effect on scientific results; from the
way computational errors (by design or execution) affect our understanding and confidence in the
science  that  computational  systems  help  generate,  to  the  resulting  relation  between  scientific
statements and code-based models. These elements are of philosophical interest and have already
consequences on the way scientific research is done. SIS is here to stay, and we better have the
conceptual and formal tools to understand it.
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